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In our 2000 paper “Information Acquisition in Financial Markets,” we argued that contrary to the
conventional wisdom set forth in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), it was theoretically possible that
as more traders in ﬁnancial markets acquire information, equilibrium prices would change in such a
w a yt h a ti tb e c a m em o r ed i ﬃcult for remaining agents to infer the fundamentals from prices. We
presented a model we thought demonstrated this claim. However, as was subsequently pointed out
to us by Christophe Chamley, the expression we used for the value of information in that paper
(expression 3.5) was incorrect. As demonstrated by Chamley (2007), using the correct expression
for the value of learning reveals that learning is a strategic substitute in that model.
This leaves the question of whether the problem lies with our example or with the argument that
when traders acquire information they can exacerbate the identiﬁcation problem of remaining agents.
In this note, we show that the argument we advanced is correct, although it requires that the
fundamental value of the asset be correlated with noise trade. Since this feature was absent from
our original model, it was incapable of generating complementarities, as Chamley (2007) reports.
To illustrate this point, we begin with a special case of the model we used in our 2000 paper to
provide the simplest example of why equilibrium prices may not become more informative as some
agents acquire information. For this special case, we can verify that complementarities only arise
if the fundamental value of the asset is correlated with noise trade. We then use this insight to
revisit our 2000 paper and show that by allowing the fundamentals and noise to be correlated,
we can capture the tension we tried to model, namely that as more traders acquire information
they make it more diﬃcult for remaining agents to discriminate between low fundamentals and a
negatively skewed distribution of supply shocks. We close with remarks on some of the work on
complementarity in information acquisition that was written since our 2000 paper was published.
11T h e 2 ×2C a s e
We use the same notation as in our 2000 paper. Brieﬂy, agents must choose to allocate their wealth
between money and an asset that pays a random amount e θ per share. There is a unit mass of
risk-neutral agents who can observe e θ if they pay a cost c. The demand of the informed traders is
denoted xI(e θ,P), and of the uninformed is denoted xU (P). Traders can spend at most their initial




− e x for some positive constant w,w h e r ee x is a random variable.





and x ∈ {x0,x 1}. We will refer to the four states of the world as ω1 through ω4,w i t h







Suppose ﬁrst that z =0 , so all traders are uninformed. In this case, prices cannot depend on e θ.
Generically, the price at x0 will be diﬀerent from x1, so the information set of an uninformed agent
given prices will be given by
Ω0 = {{ω1,ω3},{ω2,ω4}}. (1)
Next, consider a particular value z∗ ∈ (0,1) and suppose the number of informed traders z = z∗.I f
uninformed traders value information more when z = z∗, prices cannot fully reveal e θ. Hence, there
must be at least two states in which the same price prevails. We verify in a technical appendix that
the only two states in which the same price could arise are ω2 and ω3. Thus, suppose x0 and x1 are
such that when z = z∗, there exists an equilibrium for which P (ω2)=P (ω3). If such values of x0
and x1 exist, the information set of an uninformed agent would be given by
Ωz∗ = {{ω1},{ω2,ω3},{ω4}}. (2)
Comparing Ωz∗ to Ω0, note that neither partition is a ﬁner partitioning of the other. Hence, there
is no sense in which uninformed agents can be said to be inherently more informed when there are
z∗ informed traders than when there no informed traders. In other words, equilibrium prices do
not become more informative as more traders acquire information – they simply convey diﬀerent
information. This stands in contrast to what Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) obtain in their model,
where prices necessarily become more informative in some well-deﬁned sense as more agents become
informed (speciﬁcally, prices are more informative in the Blackwell sense).
The fact that prices may not become more informative as more agents acquire information does
not ensure that uninformed agents will value information more when facing the information set Ωz∗
than when facing the information set Ω0. To determine whether such a scenario is possible, we need
to manually check each of the ﬁnitely many candidate equilibria for the 2 × 2 case. Going through
the various cases reveals that this scenario is indeed possible, but only if x and θ are correlated
(the detailed calculations are delegated to an appendix). The intuition for this is that since agents
can infer e x from prices when z =0 ,t h ef a c tt h a te x is correlated implies prices are already quite
2informative about e θ even when agents are all uninformed. Once some agents become informed,
prices will depend on both e θ and e x, and it may be harder to infer e θ from prices.
To illustrate this possibility, consider the following example. Set w =1 0 , θ =5 , θ =1 0 ,a n d
x0 =0 .5.T h eﬁnal parameter, x1,i sc h o s e ns p e c i ﬁcally to give rise to equilibrium prices which are
not fully revealing. In particular, let us ﬁrst choose a particular fraction of informed traders z∗ at
which we want prices to not be fully revealing. We arbitrarily set z∗ =0 .1, and then go about
searching for an equilibrium in which P (ω2)=P (ω3) when z = z∗. The equilibrium we construct
will involve traders buying the asset at this joint price. Hence, the combined amount of wealth that
informed and uninformed traders will spend on the asset should equal 1 in state ω2 and 1 − z∗ in









These two expressions will be equal if
x1 =
w +1
w +1− z∗ (x0 +1 )− 1=0 .51. (5)






Given these parameters, there is a unique equilibrium when z =0 . In this equilibrium, uninformed









Since E(e θ|P (·,·)=6 .67) = 5.56 and E(e θ|P (·,·)=7 .27) = 9.55, uninformed traders will indeed
prefer not to buy the asset at the ﬁrst price but to buy it at the second. The value of purchasing
information is equal to the expected value of avoiding the mistakes this policy commits in states ω1














Next, consider the case where z = z∗. Informed traders buy the asset in states ω1 and ω2 and do not
buy it in states ω3 and ω4. Since equilibrium prices must fully reveal states ω1 and ω4,u n i n f o r m e d
traders will also buy the asset in state ω1 and avoid it in state ω4. We conjecture an equilibrium
where in the remaining two states ω2 and ω3 prices are given by (3) and (4), which by construction
are equal, and uninformed traders strictly prefer to buy the asset at this common price. That is, we
conjecture an equilibrium in which demand schedules and prices are as follows:
xI(e θ,P) xU (P) P(e x,e θ)
x0 x1
θ buy buy
θ don’t buy don’t buy
x0 x1
θ buy buy
θ buy don’t buy
x0 x1
θ w+1
x0+1 =7 .33 w+1
x1+1 =7 .27
θ w+1−z∗
x0+1 =7 .27 w
x1+1 =6 .61
(9)
3To conﬁrm that the demand schedule for uninformed traders is optimal, note that




so the expected payout on the asset exceeds its price, and hence the asset is more valuable than
money. The value of information in this case is equal to the expected value of avoiding the mistake








Comparing (8) and (10), it is clear that uninformed agents value becoming informed more when
z = z∗ than when z =0 ,c o n ﬁrming the possibility of learning complementarities.
As a ﬁnal remark, the complementarities in the above example can generate multiple equilibria
with diﬀerent amounts of information being acquired. Suppose the cost of information c is exactly
equal the value of information when z = z∗ in (10). Under this assumption, there are two possible
equilibrium fractions of informed agents, z =0and z = z∗. In the latter, agents are indiﬀerent
between becoming informed and not. For any other value of z, equilibrium prices must be fully
revealing, i.e. Ωz = {{ω1},{ω2},{ω3},{ω4}}, implying no agent will want to purchase information.
2 Revisiting Barlevy and Veronesi (2000)
Although the 2×2 case is convenient for demonstrating why prices need not become more informative
as more agents acquire information, the example it produces seems rather knife-edge. The example
requires that P (ω2)=P (ω3), a condition that only happens when z = z∗ and this only because
we choose a particular value for x1. For all other values of z/ ∈ {0,z∗}, prices are fully revealing. It
also implies demand for the asset by uninformed traders is increasing in the price of the asset when
z =0 . We now construct an example in which prices are never fully revealing, where the value of
information is increasing in z over an open range rather than at a particular value, and demand for
the asset by uninformed traders is always decreasing in its price.
We construct this example by revisiting the model we laid out in our original 2000 paper. In that
paper, we attempted to generate an example in which as more agents became informed, remaining
agents became worse oﬀ because they had greater diﬃculty distinguishing whether prices were low
because informed traders learned that fundamentals were unfavorable and drove prices down or
because the distribution of supply placed more mass on high realizations of e x. Since we used an
incorrect expression for the value of information, we were unaware that we were attempting to model
this in a way that does not in fact generate complementarities in information acquisition. Based on
our analysis of the 2 × 2 case, one possible way to generate this tension is to allow e x and e θ to be
correlated. We now provide a numerical example which shows that introducing correlation into our
model does in fact yield complementarities in information acquisition.
Let w =1 .1.T h ep a y o ﬀ on the asset e θ is equal to either 1 or 0.9 with equal probability. We next






.L e t x∗ denote the value of e x for which the market clearing price when half of the










Given our other parameter choices, x∗ =0 .68.L e tλ denote a positive constant that is arbitrarily
close to 0 and strictly less than 1
2.W ea s s u m ee x is distributed as a step function that depends on e θ:
f
³




(1 − λ)/x∗ if x ∈ [0,x ∗]
λ/x∗ if x ∈ (x∗,2x∗]
f
³




λ/x∗ if x ∈ [0,x ∗]
(1 − λ)/x∗ if x ∈ (x∗,2x∗]
As in the 2 × 2 case, e θ and e x are assumed to be positively correlated.1 Note that e x is positively
skewed when e θ = θ and negatively skewed when e θ = θ. In our original paper, we attempted to
construct an example in which skewness makes it more diﬃcult to read fundamentals from prices,
since a skewed distribution makes certain price more likely. This is still true in our present example,
except we now assume e x is skewed in opposite directions depending on e θ,w h e r e a sb e f o r ew et r i e d
to generate an example in which e x was skewed in the same direction for both values of e θ.
Given the parameterization above, the following set of demand and price functions constitute an
equilibrium, as shown formally in the technical appendix.
(1) The demand schedule of informed traders is given by
xI(e θ,P) ∈
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩









(2) The demand of uninformed traders is the same for all values of z,a n di sg i v e nb y
xU (P) ∈
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨























⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
w
x+1 if x +1≤ w
θ




























⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
w
x+1 if x +1≤ 2w
θ+θ
θ+θ





















x+1 if x +1≥ w+1
θ
1One way to motivate this assumption is that if a high realization of h θ reﬂected favorable economic conditions,
returns to other investments are more likely to also be high. As a result, some agents who would have held on to the
asset in less favorable economic conditions might prefer to liquidate the asset when conditions are favorable to allow
them to take advantage of proﬁt a b l ep r i v a t ei n v e s t m e n to p p o r t u n i t i e s . F o rt h ei n v e s t o r sw h o s ed e c i s i o n sw es t u d y ,
the higher selloﬀ among such agents would be viewed as “noise” trading.
5This is the same price function that appeared in our original paper (and which is depicted in Figure
1 of that paper), where the cutoﬀ P∗
z we describe there corresponds to
θ+θ
2 . Our parameterization
implies 2x∗ > w+1




is fully revealing when λ>0.









































are not revealing, λ must be strictly positive.
However, it is easier to gain intuition from the limiting case in which λ =0 . Figure 1 illustrates g(z)
for λ =0 , and shows it is constant for z ∈ [0,0.5), increases at z =0 .5, and ultimately declines.










Figure 1: The function g(z) for λ =0
In an appendix, we provide a formal argument for why g(z) is increasing just above z =0 .5.T h e
intuition is as follows. When z<0.5, uninformed traders choose the correct action for any price
P 6=
θ+θ
2 . This is because, in equilibrium, prices above
θ+θ
2 only occur when the fundamentals are
bad and prices below
θ+θ
2 only occur when the fundamentals are good. Changing z but leaving it
below 0.5 thus has no eﬀect on the prices that occur with positive probability, so g(z) is invariant to
changes in z.B u to n c ez rises above 0.5, prices in an open neighborhood of
θ+θ
2 become possible in
both states of the world, making it harder to read e θ from prices. Consider a trader who resolves that
if he is uninformed, he will buy the asset if its price is below
θ+θ
2 but not if its price is greater than
or equal to
θ+θ
2 . That is, we resolve the agent’s indiﬀerence at
θ+θ
2 in a particular way, which we
can do without loss of generality. When z<0.5, the only mistake an uninformed agent can commit
is to not purchase the asset when e θ = θ, this if the price is equal to
θ+θ
2 .A sz rises to just above
0.5, the agent will still occasionally fail to purchase the asset when e θ = θ. But now at least part of
the time he would fail to purchase the asset at prices above
θ+θ
2 . Since the asset is more expensive,
the loss from not having purchased it are smaller. On its own, this would lower the incentive to
acquire information. But it is also the case that as z rises to just above 0.5, there will be a positive
probability that the agent will buy the asset when e θ = θ because informed traders in this state may
drive the price to below
θ+θ
2 . An uninformed trader will thus commit mistakes that he would not
have committed when z<0.5, since prices are less informative. This is precisely the intuition we
tried to capture in our previous paper. Under our assumptions, the fact that traders are more likely
6to commit mistakes more than oﬀsets the fact that previous mistakes the agent committed become
less costly, and the value of information increases.
If we allow λ to be small but positive, the essential features of the above example remain unchanged.
In this case, g(z) will be decreasing over the interval [0,0.5), but will continue to increase at 0.5.I n




fully reveals the true value of e θ, demand for
the asset among uninformed traders is decreasing in its price, and the value of information will be
increasing over a range of z rather than at a single value.
3S u b s e q u e n t L i t e r a t u r e
Since our original paper was published, several other papers have been written that generate com-
plementarity in acquisition information in ﬁnancial markets, including Chamley (2006), Veldkamp
(2006), and Ganguli and Yang (2006). The mechanisms generating complementarity in these pa-
pers are diﬀerent from ours, and are thus of independent interest from the mechanism we originally
conjectured but only now truly established. Of these, the closest in spirit to ours is Ganguli and
Yang (2006). They assume informed agents receive distinct signals rather than identical signals as
in our framework, and ﬁnd that there exist equilibria in which as more agents learn, prices become
more sensitive to the variable which agents have less precise information on. This is diﬀerent from
the mechanism we construct, but shares with our mechanism the feature that it may become harder
to read fundamentals from prices as more agents acquire information. More recently, Hellwig and
Veldkamp (2007) derive conditions for complementarity in information acquisition in generalized
games, although they rule out publicly observable prices which are central to our mechanism.
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7Technical Appendix for ‘Information Acquisition in Financial
Markets: a Correction’
This appendix derives several results discussed but not formally derived in our note. The ﬁrst section
is devoted to analyzing the 2×2 case. Here we show that some prices must be fully revealing when
some agents are uninformed, and that a necessary condition for information acquisition to be a
strategic complement is that e x and e θ be correlated. The second section veriﬁes that the demand
schedules and price function we propose when we describe a revised version of 2000 model in which e x
and e θ are correlated indeed constitute an equilibrium. The third section provides a rigorous analysis
of why g(z) in that version must be increasing in z at z =0 .5.
1. Analysis of the 2×2C a s e
















. We allow e x and e θ to









must be fully revealing. Second, we show that a necessary condition for information acquisition to
be a strategic complement is that e x and e θ be correlated, i.e. that π1/π3 6= π2/π4.
Since informed traders are worse oﬀ when others are informed (prices are pushed towards fundamen-
tals, so the gains from buying the asset when e θ = θ are lower), a necessary condition for learning
to be a strategic complement is that uninformed traders also be worse oﬀ when there are more in-
formed traders. We now consider all possible equilibria to see whether any can be consistent with this
condition. We then examine when these can generate complementarity in information acquisition.
Note ﬁrst that when z =0 , uninformed traders must undertake the same decision in equilibrium for
a given realization of e x regardless of the realization of e θ. Generically, then, we have four candidates







θ don’t buy don’t buy
θ don’t buy don’t buy
Case III:
x0 x1
θ don’t buy buy
θ don’t buy buy
Case IV:
x0 x1
θ buy don’t buy
θ buy don’t buy




and (x1,θ) must be fully

















The demand of uninformed traders, xU, must be the same in both states. Demand for the asset by












w + z +( 1− z)ωU
x0 +1
(A1)
where ωU is the amount of wealth per trader spent on the asset by uninformed traders. Consider




, demand of the informed is the same, and so the market
clearing price is equal to
w + z +( 1− z)ωU
x1 +1
, which diﬀers from (A1) given x0 6= x1.A t (x0,θ),
informed traders do not buy the asset , so the market clearing price is equal to
w +( 1− z)ωU
x0 +1
which
again cannot equal (A1) given z>0. Finally, At (x1,θ), informed traders do not buy the asset, and
the market clearing price is equal to
w +( 1− z)ωU
x1 +1
which is smaller than (A1) given x1 >x 0 and
z>0. A similar argument can be used to rule out the possibility that there exists another state in
which the price is identical to P (x1,θ).




and (x0,θ) yield the same price.
Otherwise the uninformed become fully informed and never make mistakes, whereas they do commit
mistakes when z =0 . In other words, the only case in which complementarities can occur is if the
information set of an uninformed trader changes from {{ω1,ω3},{ω2,ω4}} to {{ω1},{ω2,ω3},{ω4}}
as some agents become informed.
We now work through the four candidate demand schedules for uninformed traders when z =0 :
Case I: Uninformed traders always buy when z =0 .
There are two candidate equilibria, depending on what uninformed traders do when z>0:
(i) Uninformed traders continue to buy the asset in states {ω2,ω3} after some traders become







θ buy don’t buy




























.T h e ya r eb e t t e ro ﬀ in (x1,θ) since they
no longer make a mistake. Although they continue to buy the asset in state (x0,θ),t h e yp a yl e s sf o r
the asset and hence are better oﬀ.M o v i n gt oah i g h e rz cannot make uninformed traders worse oﬀ.







θ buy don’t buy
θ don’t buy don’t buy
























.T h e y a r e b e t t e r o ﬀ in (x0,θ) and (x1,θ) since





now they stop purchasing the asset even though it yields a high payoﬀ.S o t h i s s i t u a t i o n m a y b e
compatible with complementarities (although below we show it is not).
Case II: Uninformed traders never buy when z =0 .
There are two candidate equilibria, depending on what uninformed traders do when z>0:
(i) Uninformed traders switch to buying the asset in states {ω2,ω3} after some traders become
informed. Then we have
z =0 z>0
x0 x1
θ don’t buy don’t buy
θ don’t buy don’t buy
x0 x1
θ buy buy
θ buy don’t buy




























since they no longer
make a mistake as they do when z =0 . But they are worse oﬀ in state (x0,θ) since they now
purchase an overvalued asset. So this case could be consistent with complementarities (although
b e l o ww es h o wi ti sn o t ) .
(ii) Uninformed traders continue not to buy the asset in states {ω2,ω3} after some traders become
informed. Then we have
z =0 z>0
x0 x1
θ don’t buy don’t buy
θ don’t buy don’t buy
x0 x1
θ buy don’t buy
θ don’t buy don’t buy
























they are just as well oﬀ, since they





no longer make a mistake. Moving to a higher z cannot make uninformed traders worse oﬀ.
Case III: Uninformed traders buy if x is low but not if x is high when z =0 .
There are two candidate equilibria, depending on what uninformed traders do when z>0:




θ don’t buy buy
θ don’t buy buy
x0 x1
θ buy buy
θ buy don’t buy




























and (x1,θ) since they don’t make
mistakes. But they are worse oﬀ in (x0,θ) since they make a mistake. So this could be consistent
with complementarities.




θ don’t buy buy
θ don’t buy buy
x0 x1
θ buy don’t buy
θ don’t buy don’t buy
























and (x1,θ) since they don’t




since they make a mistake. So this could be
consistent with complementarities.
Case IV: Uninformed traders buy if x is high but not if x is low when z =0 .
4There are two candidate equilibria, depending on what uninformed traders do when z>0:




θ buy don’t buy
θ buy don’t buy
x0 x1
θ buy buy
θ buy don’t buy





























no longer commit a mistake. Although they continue to make a mistake in (x0,θ),t h e yp a yl e s sf o r
the overvalued asset, and so are better oﬀ.M o v i n gt oah i g h e rz cannot make uninformed traders
worse oﬀ.




θ buy don’t buy
θ buy don’t buy
x0 x1
θ buy don’t buy
θ don’t buy don’t buy
























and (x1,θ).T h e ya r eb e t t e ro ﬀ in (x0,θ) since they




since they don’t buy (although
prices change). Moving to a higher z cannot make uninformed traders worse oﬀ.
From the eight cases above, only four are potentially compatible with complementarities: I(ii), II(i),
III(i), and III(ii). We consider each of these cases in turn.






. The beliefs of
uninformed traders are given by
Pr
µ






















































































(x0 +1 )− 1
for a particular value of z. The beliefs of an uninformed trader at P∗
z are given by
Pr
¡
















If traders prefer not to buy when the price is equal to P∗












which upon dividing through by P∗

















































































conditions (A2) and (A3) are incompatible, so complementarities are not possible in this case.






.T h e b e l i e f s o f
uninformed traders are given by
Pr
µ
























































































(x0 +1 )− 1
The beliefs of an uninformed trader at P∗
z are given by
Pr
¡




























which upon dividing through by P∗

















































































≥ 0, conditions (A4) and (A5) are incompatible, so complementarities are
not possible in this case.






. The beliefs of
uninformed traders are given by
Pr
µ




































If uninformed traders buy the asset at price
w +1
x1 +1
but not at price
w
x0 +1































































(x0 +1 )− 1
The beliefs of an uninformed trader at P∗
z are given by
Pr
¡























































8S i n c ei ti sa l w a y sp o s s i b l et od r i v eπ1 and π4 to zero and π3 to 1,i ti sa l w a y sp o s s i b l et og e n e r a t e
complementarities with this type of equilibrium.
We now prove that complementarities can only occur if π1/π3 6= π2/π4. First, note that when z =0 ,






















provided z<1. T h i si m p l i e st h a tw h e nz =0 , prices must be higher when supply is equal to x1
than when it is equal to x0.

































as we just demonstrated. It follows that π1/π3 6=
π2/π4.






. The beliefs of
uninformed traders are given by
Pr
µ




































If uninformed traders buy the asset at price
w +1
x1 +1
but not at price
w
x0 +1































































(x0 +1 )− 1
The beliefs of an uninformed trader at P∗
z are given by
Pr
¡

























































S i n c ei ti sa l w a y sp o s s i b l et od r i v eπ1 and π4 to zero and π2 to 1,i ti sa l w a y sp o s s i b l et og e n e r a t e
complementarities with this type of equilibrium.
We now prove that complementarities can only occur if π1/π3 6= π2/π4. First, note that when z =0 ,






















provided z<1. T h i si m p l i e st h a tw h e nz =0 , prices must be higher when supply is equal to x1
than when it is equal to x0.

































as we just demonstrated. It follows that π1/π3 6=
π2/π4.
To summarize, the only possible cases in which the value of information is greater when z>0 than
when z =0require that π1/π3 6= π2/π4, i.e. e x and e θ must be correlated.
102. Verifying the Equilibrium for Continuously Distributed ˜ x




with equal probability and
f
³




(1 − λ)/x∗ if x ∈ [0,x ∗]
λ/x∗ if x ∈ (x∗,2x∗]
f
³




λ/x∗ if x ∈ [0,x ∗]
(1 − λ)/x∗ if x ∈ (x∗,2x∗]
We wish to conﬁrm that the demand schedules and equilibrium price functions in our note constitute
an equilibrium.





and conﬁrm that the conjectured demand schedules in the text are optimal. For remaining
prices, it is easy to see that demand is optimal. When prices are equal to θ and θ, the state will be
fully revealed when z>0, and agents should be indiﬀerent between the asset and money. For prices
outside this range, beliefs do not matter; it will be dominant to either buy the asset or hold money.















,w h e r ex0 (P) and x1 (P) denote
the respective values of x at which the price function assumes a value of P. By Bayes’ rule, the






























x1 (P)|e θ = θ
´
Consider ﬁrst the case where 0 ≤ z ≤ 1





,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t

























θ = θ | P (·,·)=P
¢







expected value of the asset is lower than the price, and so uninformed traders should optimally

























in which case E
¡
θ = θ | P (·,·)=P
¢





>Pand so uninformed traders
should optimally buy the asset.
Lastly, if P =
θ+θ
2 ,t h ef a c tt h a tf
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x|e θ = θ
´
dx
11w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e s
Pr
³







and so uninformed agents should be indiﬀerent between buying the asset and not buying. Hence,




, our conjectured demand is optimal.
Next, we consider the case where 1





, the ordering can
be either x0 (P) <x 1 (P) ≤ x∗ or x0 (P) <x ∗ ≤ x1 (P). The probability that e θ = θ in these two
respective cases is given by
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In either case, the expected value E
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the asset remains the optimal course of action. Finally, by symmetry it remains true that
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conjectured demand is optimal.
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or alternatively
P (x,θ)=
w + zωI +( 1− z)ωU
x +1
(A6)
where ωI is the amount of wealth per trader spent on the asset by informed traders, and ωU is
analogously deﬁned for unemployed workers. Using expression for P (x,θ) and the demand schedule
for both types of traders conﬁrms that the proposed price function is consistent with the market
clearing price in (A6).
3. Properties of g(z) at z =0 .5
In our note, we plot g(z) against z for several numerical values and show that is has an upward
sloping region. In this last section, we provide a graphical-based argument for why g(z) must be
increasing at z =0 .5.
12Figure A1 illustrates the equilibrium price function P (x,θ) for z =0 .5 − ε and z =0 .5+ε when
ε is small. The heavy lines in each panel correspond to prices that occur with positive probability,
while the thin line correspond to prices that occur with zero probability when λ =0(or with very
small probability if λ>0). Formally, the only prices that occur with positive probability density
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The arrows in the ﬁgure are meant to represent the eﬀect of increasing z on the equilibrium price




to the right, and the
lower branch of P (x,θ) to the left. As evident from the ﬁgure, changes in z when z<0.5 will only
aﬀect the equilibrium price function in a region that occurs with zero probability. For this reason,
changes in z have no eﬀect on the value of information g(z) so long as z<0.5. By contrast, when
z>0.5, changes in z aﬀect the price function in a region that occurs with positive probability.
To understand why an increase in z just above 0.5 will lead to an increase in g(z),w ec a nu s et h e
fact that for z ≈ 0.5, g(z) is approximately proportional to the area between the equilibrium price
and either θ or θ, depending on whether an uninformed trader buys the asset or not, for prices in
which an uninformed trader takes the wrong action. This area corresponds to the shaded area in
the ﬁgure, which assumes an uninformed trader avoids buying the asset when indiﬀerent, i.e. at a
price of
θ+θ
2 .W h e n z<0.5, the only mistake this trader commits is not buying the asset when
it is valuable. The cost is therefore proportional to the shaded rectangle in the left panel. As z
rises to just above 0.5,w es h a v eo ﬀ a corner from this rectangle. This reﬂects the fact that when
the trader fails to buy the asset, the price of the asset will be higher given z is higher, at least for
some realizations of x. Learning the true value of e θ in order to purchase the asset when e θ is high
is thus less valuable. At the same time, as z rises to just above 0.5,w ea l s oa d dt h ea r e ao ft h e
trapezoid to the left of x∗.T h i sr e ﬂects the fact that the trader might now purchase the asset when
i t sf u n d a m e n t a l sa r el o w ,s p e c i ﬁcally as informed prices drive down the price of the asset when e θ = θ.
When z<0.5, the trader would not have committed such a mistake. Since the area of the trapezoid
exceeds the area of the triangle we subtract from the original cost, the total area must rise.
Formally, the implication of Figure A1 is that for λ =0 , the fall in the cost of mistakes a trader
already committed is a second order eﬀect when z =0 .5, while the increase in the probability of
making a mistake is a ﬁrst order eﬀect at this value. Hence, g(z) must increase as z rises in this



































x|e θ = θ
´
dx (A7)
Setting z =0 .5, the limits of integration
2(w+z)
θ+θ − 1 and
2(w+1−z)
θ+θ − 1 in (A7) both collapse to x∗.
When λ =0 , it follows that f
³
x|e θ = θ
´
=0for x>x ∗, f
³
x|e θ = θ
´
=0for x<x ∗,s ot h ev a l u e
of the two integrals in (A7) collapse to zero, conﬁrming these terms are second order for z around
130.5. As for the remaining term, the fact that limx→x∗+ f
³
x|e θ = θ
´
=1 /x∗ implies that as we take
the limit from the right, this expression is equal to
θ−θ
x∗(θ+θ)
2,c o n ﬁrming that the ﬁrst order eﬀect of
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